{
  "@context": "https://w3id.org/codemeta/3.0",
  "@type": "SoftwareSourceCode",
  "name": "Claim Verification: \u201cLet G be a finite strategic-form game. (A) If G admits a generalized ordinal potential P, then every better-response path is finite, G has the finite improvement property, and G admits a pure Nash equilibrium. (B) If G admits an exact potential P, then every global maximizer of P is a pure Nash equilibrium.\u201d \u2014 Proved",
  "description": "Verdict: PROVED",
  "version": "1.33.2",
  "dateCreated": "2026-04-28",
  "license": "https://spdx.org/licenses/MIT",
  "codeRepository": "https://github.com/yaniv-golan/proof-engine",
  "url": "https://proofengine.info/proofs/potential-games-fip-and-pure-nash/",
  "author": [
    {
      "@type": "Organization",
      "name": "Proof Engine"
    }
  ]
}